CIVIL RIGHTS/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—INDEBTED TO THE STATE: HOW THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S PROMISE OF ABOLITION HOLDS PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS by Morgan, Sarah
Western New England Law Review
Volume 39 39 (2017)
Issue 2 Article 7
2017
CIVIL RIGHTS/CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW—INDEBTED TO THE STATE: HOW
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S
PROMISE OF ABOLITION HOLDS
PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE MODERN
DEBTORS’ PRISONS
Sarah Morgan
Western New England University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sarah Morgan, CIVIL RIGHTS/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—INDEBTED TO THE STATE: HOW THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT’S PROMISE OF ABOLITION HOLDS PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS, 39 W.





CIVIL RIGHTS/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—INDEBTED TO THE 
STATE: HOW THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S PROMISE OF 
ABOLITION HOLDS PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE MODERN 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
Sarah Morgan* 
Cash-starved municipalities regularly impose criminal justice 
debt on individuals too poor to pay.  Local courts deny criminal 
debtors’ a meaningful inquiry into their ability to pay prior to 
being assessed sky-high fees, often predictably resulting in 
default on their payments.  Nonpayment under these municipal 
schemes is enforced through imprisonment solely for the 
purpose of compelling repayment.  Under these circumstances, 
criminal debtors find themselves in modern debtors’ prisons, a 
conceptual cycle of debt and imprisonment nearly impossible to 
escape.  This Note will argue the modern debtors’ prison is 
peonage, coerced labor for the repayment of debt, which is 
prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment and enforced 
through the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867.  This Note will consider 
the current remedial scheme under the Anti-Peonage Act as a 
potential remedy to the modern debtors’ prison and argue this 
scheme is insufficient to protect low-income criminal debtors 
from insidious municipal revenue collection practices.  Further, 
it will propose Congress should utilize its enforcement powers 
within section two of the Thirteenth Amendment to enhance 
existing private remedies under the Peonage Act, and 
effectively dismantle the modern debtors’ prison. 
INTRODUCTION 
Set aside your image of a post-Obama color-blind America.1  
 
*  Candidate for J.D., 2017, Western New England University School of Law.  I 
appreciate the thoughtful and painstaking work of my colleagues on the Western New 
England Law Review for their contributions to this Note.  Additional thanks to 
Professor Bruce Miller, for supervising the Note’s development, and Professors Erin 
Buzuvis and Harris Freeman for their endless guidance.  Finally, I am deeply grateful 
for my ever-supportive loves, Kevin and Arden, who fulfil my life in myriad fun, silly, 
and happy ways. 
1.  See generally Daniel Schorr, A New, ‘Post-Racial’ Political Era in America, 
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Wipe clean your impression that the Civil Rights Movement of the 
1960’s solved the “race problem.”2  And above all, suspend your 
disbelief that the Emancipation Proclamation3 abolished slavery.4  
For today’s social, political, and especially economic subjugation of 
people of color flies in the face of America’s gauzy, race-neutral 
ideations.5  Racism prevails, taking on new forms as implicit and 
explicit biases against poor people of color, in the minds and hearts 
of our political and judicial figures.6  And, as this Note will argue, 
slavery continues in its new manifestation of the debtors’ prison, 
although, absolutely none of this is truly “new.” 
It begins with a minor offense: a moving violation, a citation 
for jaywalking, or a parking ticket.7  Before a hearing for the 
offense has even commenced, booking fees, bail, and defense 
counsel application fees are attached.8  In other instances, it arises 
post-conviction: monthly probation payments, installation costs for 
an automobile interlock device, or required contribution for court-
appointed counsel.9  To anyone with a steady income, a deep 
savings account, or a financially prosperous personal network, 
 
NPR (Jan. 28, 2008, 4:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=18489466 [https://perma.cc/T2PZ-C599] (acknowledging the public 
discourse surrounding President Obama’s 2008 election as potentially marking a new 
“era” in race relations). 
2.  ROY L. BROOKS, RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 10–11 (Princeton 
U. Press 2009) (defining the modern race problem—post-Civil Rights Movement—as 
racial inequality and disparate resource allocation, distinct from the post-Jim-Crow era 
race problem which was marked by clunky attempts at equality and integration). 
3.  The Emancipation Proclamation, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., 
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/ 
[http://perma.cc/D84H-TZG7]. 
4.  Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Wholly Misunderstood Emancipation Proclamation, 
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2013) (describing Emancipation as a process of “integrating 
African American as citizens of equal standing[,]” which “continues even today.”). 
5.  See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, The End of the Postracial Myth, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/20/magazine/
donald-trumps-america-iowa-race.html [https://perma.cc/N7DN-3V9N]. 
6.  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT 
BIAS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/Implicit%20Bias%20FAQs
%20rev.ashx [https://perma.cc/TM32-64L7 ]. 
7.  See Christopher D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons, AM. J. 
CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2017), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17840773 
[http://perma.cc/AHZ5-ESKB]. 
8.  Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1186–90 (2014). 
9.  Id. at 1190–96. 
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these legal financial obligations10 (“LFOs”) represent nothing more 
than a momentary hardship—write one check and all returns to 
normal.11  For everyone else, the inability to scrounge up sums of 
cash on the spot could result in an indefinite stay in the county jail, 
for which additional fines and fees are compounded onto a growing 
bill.12  This cycle, from the imposition of LFOs for non-violent 
minor offenses to indefinite incarceration, repeats in municipalities 
across the country in a conceptual confine known as the modern 
debtors’ prison.13 
This Note will argue that the modern debtors’ prison is 
unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against involuntary servitude and peonage.14  Section II.A. will 
argue that, in keeping with the expansive spirit of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the modern debtors’ prison is a violation of the 
prohibition against peonage.15  Section II.B. will demonstrate that 
the modern debtors’ prison is not exempt from the protections of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, because the practices which give rise 
to it do not constitute “punishment” as used in contemporary legal 
discussion.16  Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment provides a 
source of constitutionally-guaranteed rights from being subjected 
to the modern debtors’ prison. 
Section II.C. will explore the remedies available for violations 
of constitutionally guaranteed rights to not be held to conditions of 
peonage.  In Section II.D., the Note will assert Congress should 
take advantage of its broad enforcement powers under section two 
of the Thirteenth Amendment and enact a prohibition against the 
modern debtors’ prison, providing enhanced civil remedies for 
imprisonment for criminal debts.17  Finally, Section II.D. will 
address anticipated counterarguments: first, it will argue that City 
 
10.  Eric Balaban, Shining a Light into Dark Corners: A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Successful Advocacy to Curb Debtor’s Prisons, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 275, 275 (2014).  
Legal financial obligations, or LFO’s, include “the fines and court costs associated with 
a criminal conviction.”  Id. 
11.  Id. at 276. 
12.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8 at 1192. 
13.  AM. C.L. UNION, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ 
Prisons, AM. C.L. UNION 1, 10 (2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
InForAPenny_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVF6-PZ5P] [hereinafter In for a Penny]. 
14.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
15.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1994. 
16.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
17.  See id. 
  
330 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:327 
of Boerne v. Flores18 does not restrict Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers, and; second, it will demonstrate 
how federalism concerns do not preclude a remedial statute based 
on the Thirteenth Amendment. 
I. DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN THE HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 
Since the early days of this country, courts have operated as 
revenue systems, squeezing precious dollars from the pockets of 
the poorest individuals and imprisoning them for failure to pay.19  
Existing judicial and legislative protections fail to prevent this 
practice20—and, as this Note will argue, the time has come for a 
new strategy.  In 1865, Congress passed the Thirteenth 
Amendment as one of three Reconstruction Amendments.21  Its 
purpose was to prohibit all forms of slavery and involuntary 
servitude.22  One hundred fifty-one years and countless interpretive 
challenges later, the Thirteenth Amendment remains a relevant 
source of civil rights protection.23  It provides a source of 
constitutionally-guaranteed rights which are immediately 
enforceable against the modern debtors’ prison and has the power 
to institutionalize long-term prohibition.24 
 
18.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
19.  See Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1180–85. 
20.  See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding 
unconstitutional the practice of imprisoning defendants too poor to pay a fine); see also 
Joseph Shapiro, Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtors Prisons, NPR 
(May 21, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-
ruling-not-enough-to-prevent-debtors-prisons [http://perma.cc/F2WY-NZTT]; In for a 
Penny, supra note 13, at 5 (2010). 
21.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. 
amend. XV; see also Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U.L. REV. 
77, 85–86 (2010) [hereinafter McAward 2010]. 
22.  Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1337, 1338–39 (2009) [hereinafter Tsesis 2009]. 
23.  See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN 
FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 92–93 (N.Y. U. Press, 2004) (arguing the Thirteenth 
Amendment is currently underutilized as both a source of individual rights and for 
Congressional authority, and thus, “the full wisdom of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
humanistic principles is yet to be tapped.”) [hereinafter TSESIS 2004]. 
24.  Some scholars have argued the Thirteenth Amendment provides a source of 
constitutional rights against debtors’ prisons as they arise out of civil debt, which is not 
the focus of this Note.  See materials infra note 52. 
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A. Historical Debtors’ Prisons 
Debtors’ prisons seen in the early days of the nation, carried 
over from Britain, imprisoned a large population of colonial 
Americans for their civil debts.25  Under this practice at common 
law, a creditor first “stripped the debtor of his property,” and, “if 
any portion of the claim remained unsatisfied, [threw] him into 
prison and [kept] him there for life without food or clothing unless 
he found means to discharge the obligation.”26  Faulty logic plagued 
this institution, since, “if a debtor is unable to earn a sufficient 
amount to pay his debts when at liberty to work, he certainly 
cannot with such liberty withheld.”27  Creditors of civil debts had 
the law, and the remedies it provided, on their side.28  The same 
was true for criminal debts owed to the government—law 
enforcement and court administrators had self-serving financial 
incentives to draw people into the courts and collect fines and fees 
from them.29 
In the 1750s, a movement against debtors’ prisons emerged, 
drawing parallels between imprisonment for debt and African 
American slavery.30  Additionally, federal bankruptcy reform eased 
some of the strain on struggling debtors.31  The federal backlash 
against the debtors’ prisons spurred state constitutional and 
statutory measures.32  Among their limitations, many of the state 
constitutional provisions carved out exceptions for debts arising out 
of crime, thereby limiting the protections only to those debts 
arising out of contracts.33  Today’s de facto debtors’ prisons34 are 
called such for their striking similarities to their institutionalized 
 
25.  Hampson, supra note 7, at 15–17.  For an interesting article describing 
English debtors’ prisons, see Philip Woodfine, Debtors, Prisons, and Petitions in 
Eighteenth-Century England, in 30 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE 1 (2006), 
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/eighteenth-century_life/v030/30.2woodfine.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R63S-UTWL]. 
26.  S. F. Kneeland, The American Marshalsea, 1 COUNSELLOR 216, 217 (1891). 
27.  Id. 
28.  See Woodfine, supra note 25, at 4. 
29.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1182.  
30.  Hampson, supra note 7, at 20. 
31.  Id. at 22–23. 
32.  Id.  For a detailed analysis of utilizing state debtors’ prison bans to combat 
the modern debtors’ prison, see HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASS’N, State Bans on 
Debtors’ Prison and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1024 (2016). 
33.  Hampson, supra note 7, at 27–28. 
34.  See infra Section II.B. 
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predecessors.35  However, as this Note will argue, the modern 
debtors’ prison more closely resembles another prohibited practice: 
the unconstitutional institution of peonage.36 
B. Modern Debtors’ Prisons 
The practice of employing courts as revenue generators has a 
long history in both England and the United States.37  Likewise, 
today, municipalities are focused heavily on their ever-depleting 
coffers and use imprisonment for nonpayment of criminal debt to 
enforce their fee schedules.38  Municipal courts around the country 
impose fines, fees, or legal financial obligations (“LFOs”) on 
people too poor to pay.39  These policies sweep poor people into a 
cycle of indebtedness and imprisonment—the conceptual “modern 
debtors’ prison”—that cannot be easily escaped.40  Unlike the 
debtors’ prisons of yore, today’s debtors’ prisons bear a marked 
distinction; rather than being standalone physical institutions 
within which civil debtors of all races are held, those seen today 
invisibly snare low-income individuals, primarily people of color, in 
their grasp. 
Alabama resident Ms. Gina Ray is one such individual who 
was thrust into the modern debtors’ prison when, in 2009, she was 
fined $179 for speeding.41  Next, her license was revoked when she 
failed to appear in court after a miscommunication regarding her 
court date.42  The next time Ms. Ray was pulled over, she was 
 
35.  See, e.g., Torie Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become 
Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 189, 202 (2016). 
36.  See United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2002).   
37.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1179–85; see supra Section I.A. 
38.  In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
39.  See AM. C.L. UNION, Louisiana’s Debtors’ Prisons: An Appeal to Justice, 
AM. C.L. UNION 5, 7 (2015), http://www.laaclu.org/resources/LADebtorsPrisons_
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/96NZ-279T] [hereinafter Louisiana’s DP]; In for a Penny, 
supra note 13; see generally Alicia Bannon et al., Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to 
Reentry, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G6CB-PDJW] (investigating the widespread use of municipal court fines and fees). 
40.  Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for 
Probation, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-
fees-multiply-as-companies-profit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/CTQ5-
M4P2]. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
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driving with a suspended license and assessed fees over $1,500.43  
Unable to pay, she was jailed, charged for each day she spent 
behind bars, and her debt was turned over to a private probation 
company for collection.44  For a single speeding ticket, Ms. Ray 
spent forty days in jail and accrued $3,170 in criminal justice debt 
owed to a private corporation.45 
Ms. Ray’s story is one of many around the country that 
demonstrate the variety of ways the modern debtors’ prison 
incapacitates individuals.46  This Section will describe several 
salient features, which emerge across these stories, to define 
distinct characteristics of the modern debtors’ prison.47  Often, an 
individual is arrested or ticketed for a minor underlying offense 
that would ordinarily carry no threat of imprisonment,48 for which 
legal financial obligations are imposed without inquiry into the 
 
43.  Id.  Municipalities that employ these practices may have no public 
transportation, or it may be unreliable or inaccessible.  For individuals with these sky-
high court fees, driving without a license is sometimes unavoidable.  Id. 
44.  Dozens of these for-profit corporations “operate in hundreds of courts” in 
Georgia.  Id. 
45.  See id. 
46.  See generally Bannon, supra note 39; In for a Penny, supra note 13.  As of 
this writing, municipalities around the country face civil rights suits for these practices, 
including Ferguson and Jennings, Missouri; Jackson, Mississippi; New Orleans, 
Louisiana; Rutherford County, Tennessee; Alexander City, Alabama; DeKalb County, 
Georgia; and Biloxi, Missouri; more suits are filed on an almost weekly basis.  See 
generally Class Action Complaint, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-00348-HSO-
JCG (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
kennedy_v._city_of_biloxi__complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YS3-RB69]; Class Action 
Complaint, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-732, 2015 WL 5949208 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 
9, 2015); Class Action Complaint, Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corrs., Inc., No. 3:15-
cv-01048, 2015 WL 5754498, (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2015); First Amended Class Action 
Complaint, Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. 15-cv-4479 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/First-Amended-
Complaint-9-22-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EAV-WGBN]; Complaint, Foster v. City of 
Alexander City, No. 3:15-cv-00647-WKW-SRW, 2015 WL 5256630, (M.D. Ala Sept. 8, 
2015); Class Action Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 15-cv-253, 2015 WL 
510270 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015); Class Action Complaint, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, 
No. 4:15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YA58-QVQP]; Complaint, Thompson v. DeKalb Cty., No. 1:15-mi-
99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
2015.01.29_filed_thompson_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5W8-BN58].   
47.  See, e.g., Bannon, supra note 39. 
48.  Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595, 1655 
(2015). 
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defendant’s ability to pay.49  Next, a low-income defendant is 
typically jailed for the purpose of repaying their debt.50  Finally, the 
modern debtors’ prison often has health, economic, community, 
and racial impacts wider than the individual defendant.51 
1. The Specifics about Court-Imposed LFOs and Their 
Revenue Generating Purpose 
The criminal justice costs, and LFOs, for which individuals are 
jailed fall into several categories: fines, fees, and restitution.52  Fines 
are statutorily-established monetary penalties imposed on 
defendants as a condition of their sentence.53  Fines, combined with 
fees,54 constitute large percentages of municipal government 
budgets;55 aggressive law enforcement tactics are often employed to 
garner arrests for petty offenses to meet the demand for revenue.56  
“[A] government that can fob off costs on criminals has an 
incentive to find criminals everywhere,” making the link between 
 
49.  See infra Sections I.B.1., I.B.2. 
50.  See infra Section I.B.3. 
51.  See infra Section I.B.4. 
52.  Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015, 7:15 AM), https:// www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/24/
debtors-prisons-then-and-now-faq [http://perma.cc/Q6R9-SDY9].  In addition to the 
criminal justice LFOs, a second broad category of debts for which poor people are 
imprisoned are civil “consumer” debts, “which indigent borrowers rely on but struggle 
to repay.”  Id.  These debts are the worthy subject of study, but are outside the scope of 
this Note.  The focus here is criminal “legal debt [which] is particularly injurious,” 
since, unlike civil debt, criminal debtors cannot discharge their LFO debt in 
bankruptcy, and nonpayment “may trigger an arrest warrant, arrest, or incarceration.”  
Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in 
the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1763 (2010), http://
faculty.washington.edu/kbeckett/articles/AJS.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7CF-985A].  For 
more information about the role civil debts play in the modern debtors’ prison, see 
generally Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990); Richard E. James, 
Note, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: Reforming the 
Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143 (2002); Zoë Elizabeth Lees, Note, 
Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment Implications in Payday Lending, 15 
SCHOLAR 63 (2012); Ian Liberty, Note, From Debt Collection to Debt Slavery: How 
the Modern Practice of Debt Collection is a Violation of the 13th Amendment’s 
Prohibition on Involuntary Servitude, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 281 (2014). 
53.  Hager, supra note 52.  
54.  See infra Section I.B.1. 
55.  See infra text accompanying notes 77 and 78; In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 
8–9. 
56.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1194.  Such tactics include “aggressive 
towing for parking violations” and other traffic enforcement offenses.  Id. 
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these policing tactics and revenue collection more than apparent.57 
The second category of costs involves a court’s “user fees” 
assessed to defendants either pre- or post-judgment.58  Before an 
individual even appears in court,59 he may incur booking fees,60 
probation-like deferred prosecutorial program fees,61 pre-trial 
abatement,62 bail,63 and defense counsel fees.64 
Fees assessed post-judgment include such costs as prosecution 
fees,65 the per-diem cost of incarceration,66 and parole and 
 
57.  Id. at 1178.  Perhaps not coincidentally, one of the first debtors’ prison suits 
filed against many municipalities was in Ferguson, Missouri.  Class Action Complaint, 
Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-253, 2015 WL 510270 (E.D. Mo. 2015).  It was in 
Ferguson where a police officer encountered eighteen year-old Michael Brown 
jaywalking in his neighborhood, which resulted in Brown being fatally shot.  Jake 
Halpern, The Cop, NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/08/10/the-cop [http://perma.cc/E5S3-9QA7].  This shooting sparked 
nationwide riots and prompted the Department of Justice to investigate the Ferguson 
police, which found Ferguson law enforcement prioritizes revenue generation at “every 
stage of the enforcement process.”  CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T 9–10 (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGU5-AAR8] [hereinafter 
FERGUSON REPORT].  
58.  See Hager, supra note 52; Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1193.   
59.  The deliberate use of the pronoun ‘he’ in this context represents the 
overwhelming gender disparity in the criminal justice system.  “[M]ales have made up 
at least 85% of the total jail population” in the United States since 2000.  BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/jim14_sum.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VAT-R6DV].  See Harris, supra 
note 52, at 1760.   
60.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1186. 
61.  Id. at 1187.  These fees arise when a defendant agrees to complete a program 
that the prosecutor recommends in return for deferred filing of charges against the 
defendant—sometimes seen in “pre-trial diversion.”  Id. 
62.  Id. at 1188.  These payments are sometimes paid to police or courts to stop 
the prosecution from proceeding, resulting in the charges being dropped and hidden 
from a defendant’s criminal record.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 1189.  “Bail” is a money payment made to the court in exchange for 
pre-trial release, which may be imposed in the discretion of the court and serves as a 
promise to return for a later hearing.  Id. 
64.  Id.  Often defendants who qualify for court-appointed counsel must still pay 
“an up-front ‘application’ fee or ‘co-payment’ for appointed counsel, in an amount tied 
to the severity . . . of the charge.”  Id.  That is, if they are provided the opportunity to 
apply for a defender.  See Louisiana’s DP, supra note 39, at 8.  See generally Beth A. 
Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929 (2014). 
65.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1190–92.  State and local governments 
attempt to recoup, from defendants, the costs of maintaining the system itself, such as 
security personnel, court administration, laboratory costs, state pension funds, or 
inmate medical facilities (regardless of whether the particular individual made use of 
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probation costs.67  Many governments contract with for-profit 
corporations, like Judicial Corrections Services68 and Sentinel 
Offender Services,69 to provide private probation services (as is the 
case in Ms. Ray’s hometown of Childersburg, Alabama).70  
Through these arrangements, the probation company provides 
probation services at no cost to the municipality; those services are 
instead charged to defendants.71  When a defendant is unable to 
pay up-front, probation companies will often enter into a long-term 
payment arrangement, whereby the offender becomes indebted to 
the company, rather than the municipality.72  The companies may 
then add additional fees for supervisory services, which may change 
on a whim since they are not subject to governmental oversight.73 
 
such treatment).  Id. 
66.  Forty-one states bill the cost of incarceration to inmates themselves.  Hager, 
supra note 52 (citing State-by-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312455680/state-by-state-court-fees [https://perma.cc/
VB8X-NQFU].  See also Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1192; Bill P., Letter to the 
Editor, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015, 11:49 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/letters/242-bill-p-letter-i-was-also-charged-approximately-
80-per-day [http://perma.cc/AK88-6X7A]. 
67.  Forty-four states bill the cost of parole and probation to the offender.  
Bronner, supra note 40; Hager, supra note 52 (citing State-by-State Court Fees, supra 
note 66).  See also Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1192.   
68.  About Us, JUDICIAL CORR. SERVS., https://www.judicialservices.com/about-
us/ [http://perma.cc/HA8Y-R5LY]. 
69.  Partnering with Courts, SENTINEL, https://www.sentineladvantage.com/
partnering-with-courts/ [http://perma.cc/SR9D-N5YQ]. 
70.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1193.  See also Bronner, supra note 40.  
“The practice is particularly robust in the South—in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, 
Tennessee and Mississippi—but has spread as far as Montana, Washington and Utah.”  
Tierney Sneed, Private Misdemeanor Probation Industry Faces New Scrutiny, U.S. 
NEWS (Feb. 6, 2015, 11:30 AM), http:/www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/02/06/
private-misdemeanor-probation-industry-faces-new-scrutiny [http://perma.cc/K4UQ-
P2R8]. 
71.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S 
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 2–3 (2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TNW-4MSW].   
72.  Sneed, supra note 70.  This arrangement relieves cash-strapped municipalities 
who no longer need to expend public revenue for probation services—making this 
transaction highly rewarding with little risk to the municipality.  See HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 71, at 2–3.  Because payment of fees remains a condition of 
probation, the debtor, and indeed the debt itself, remains tied to the underlying 
criminal offense, even though keeping up with payments of the “supervision” fee is 
often the only thing keeping them from jail.  Id.  
73.  Id.  See also Bill Kimber, Lawsuit Against Childersburg May Go to Trial in 




2017] INDEBTED TO THE STATE: MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS 337 
Restitution, the third category of LFOs, is the defendant’s 
payment to the victim of the offense for personal or property 
damage,74 as a form of “making the victim whole” in the criminal 
context.75  This Note does not focus on restitution, since it is 
inherently connected to an individual’s offense, and is therefore a 
component of their “punishment.”76 
Fines and court user fees, identified previously as the “first” 
and “second” category of LFOs, create the foundation of the 
modern debtors’ prison.  State and local governments, eager to 
relieve taxpayers of burgeoning criminal justice costs, increasingly 
turn to monetary penalties to satisfy the operational costs of their 
criminal justice systems.77  Revenue collected from these fines and 
fees constitutes massive portions of municipal budgets; for 
example, in Austin, Texas, traffic fines comprised forty-five percent 
of the city’s Municipal Court budget.78  A National Public Radio 
(“NPR”) investigation into this practice found that nearly all states 
have increased their court fees since 2010.79  Many of the fifteen 
states identified in the NPR study imposed additional fees when 
individuals failed to make payments toward their payment plans, 
without considering the individuals’ financial status.80  
 
[http:// perma.cc/2RZX-N8UY]. 
74.  Hager, supra note 52. 
75.  See, e.g., CATHARINE M. GOODWIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 
§ 6:21 GOAL IS TO RESTORE THE VICTIM (2016) (citing United States v. Ferdman, 779 
F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Thus, the principal aim of such restitution is to 
ensure that crime victims, to the extent possible, are made whole for their losses.”)).  
76.  That is, for the purpose of a Thirteenth Amendment analysis.  See infra 
Section II.B. 
77.  COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BRIEF, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: 
PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT 
THE POOR 2 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RLW-2YPV]; see supra text 
accompanying notes 65–67. 
78.  ALLYSON FREDERICKSEN & LINNEA LASSITER, ALL. FOR A JUST SOC’Y, 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS REDUX: HOW LEGAL LOOPHOLES LET COURTS ACROSS THE 
COUNTRY CRIMINALIZE POVERTY 2 (2015), http://allianceforajustsociety.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Debtors-Prisons-Redux-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8AE-
PJ37]. 
79.  State-by-State Court Fees, supra note 66.  Only three governments have not 
shown an increase since 2010: Alaska, the District of Columbia, and North Dakota.  Id.  
Conversely, Florida added twenty new categories of LFOs and increased existing fees 
in both 2008 and 2009.  Bannon, supra note 39, at 7. 
80.  Bannon, supra note 39, at 17–18.  The Brennan Center terms these fees—late 
payment fees, collection fees the states authorize private collection agencies to recover, 
and fees for entering into a payment plan—“poverty penalties,” because they 
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Compounding the issue, many municipal courts fail to keep 
adequate records of these collection schemes.81  This lack of 
transparency makes it difficult for defendants to defend themselves 
in court and for advocates to access the information they need to 
evaluate the extent of the modern debtors’ prisons.82 
2. Assessment of Fees Without a Meaningful Inquiry into a 
Defendant’s Inability to Pay 
Typically, in the modern debtors’ prison, courts impose LFOs 
without assessing a defendant’s ability to pay.83  The Supreme 
Court sought to curb the practice of incarcerating people for their 
inability to pay criminal debts in the early eighties.84  In Bearden v. 
Georgia,85 the defendant’s parole was revoked for failure to pay a 
fine.  The Court held that due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires courts to take into consideration a 
defendant’s inability to pay.86  When bona fide efforts toward 
repayment have been made, the state must seek other penal 
methods87 and can only imprison a defendant who has shown a 
willful refusal to pay.88  Combined with earlier holdings in Williams 
v. Illinois89 and Tate v. Short,90 the Court has precluded lower 
courts from discriminating against criminal defendants for their 
inability to pay LFOs.91  These Fourteenth Amendment due 
process protections, however, have failed to prevent the modern 
 
“effectively penalize people solely for being poor.”  Id. 
81.  Id. at 10–11. 
82.  In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 40–41. 
83.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1186–89; Bannon, supra note 39, at 13. 
84.  Logan & Wright, supra note 8, at 1200. 
85.  461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
86.  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1983).  
87.  Despite this constitutional guarantee for meaningful alternatives to 
imprisoning indigent defendants, the Brennan Center found that only twelve out of 
fifteen states studied offered community service alternatives.  Bannon, supra note 39, at 
15.  Some courts rarely converted LFOs into community service.  Id. 
88.  Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672–73.  
89.  399 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1970) (holding the State may not imprison people 
longer than the outer limits of incarceration it needs to “satisfy its penological interests 
and policies” simply due to a defendant’s indigency). 
90.  401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding a State cannot convert a monetary sentence into 
jail time simply because the defendant is indigent and cannot pay; the State must 
choose an alternative enforcement method). 
91.  Balaban, supra note 10 at 275–76. 
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debtors’ prison from emerging in many municipalities.92 
For example, in the Superior Court of Benton County, 
Washington, “the average LFO is $2540 [sic] per case,” which is 
imposed without taking into account an individual’s ability to pay.93  
The county offers community service as an alternative to 
incarceration, but work crew participants are required to pay a 
daily $5 participation fee up front—not a meaningful alternative.94  
Additionally, the debtor can be thrown into jail for missing work 
crew or even one payment.95 
3. Imprisonment for Nonpayment—or Something Like That 
Once fees are imposed on an individual unable to pay, he 
usually defaults on his debt.96  Individuals who fall behind on 
payment plans to private probation companies have their “freedom 
contingent on paying those fees.”97  Courts have developed other 
legal, although objectionable, means of navigating around Bearden 
to permit imprisoning individuals for nonpayment.98  The most 
egregious circumvention of Fourteenth Amendment guarantee is a 
practice called “pay-or-stay.”99  Criminal debtors in these 
jurisdictions are offered the option of either paying their debt in 
full at the time of their hearing or “serv[ing] jail time to satisfy 
debts.”100  Essentially, an indigent offender “volunteers” for jail 
time as a means of repayment, where imprisonment for his failure 
to pay would normally be prohibited on Equal Protection 
 
92.  See Shapiro, supra note 20; Balaban, supra note 10 at 275–76. 
93.  AM. C.L. UNION OF WASH., Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons: The Ways 
Court-Imposed Debts Punish People for Being Poor, AM. C.L. UNION 4 (2014), https:// 
www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/media-legacy/attachments/Modern%20Day%
20Debtor%27s%20Prison%20Final%20%283%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SZZ-GYXG] 
[hereinafter Washington’s DP].  Once assessed, the total LFO debt increases rapidly 
“due to a 12% interest rate and added collection fees of $100 per year.  A person 
making $20 payments per month on an average case may be unable to pay off his LFO 
debt even after decades of regular payment.”  Id. 
94.  Id. at 9; Bannon, supra note 39, at 15. 
95.  Washington’s DP, supra note 93. 
96.  Id. at 9–10. 
97.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 71, at 2–3. 
98.  For a discussion about the other three circumventions around the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibition—imprisonment for driving with a suspended license, failure to 
appear, and contempt of court—see FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 4–
6. 
99.  Id. at 6. 
100.  Id. 
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grounds.101  For example, in Washington State, defendants are told 
if they are unable to pay the full amount up front, each day they sit 
in jail earns them credits toward their outstanding balance.102  
Unfortunately, Washington is not alone in this practice.103 
4. Racial and Economic Impacts of the Modern Debtors’ 
Prison 
This unfortunate cycle has severe impacts on an individual’s 
well-being, his family, and his community, which fall 
disproportionately on individuals of color.  For some individuals, 
the modern debtors’ prison can exacerbate pre-existing mental and 
physical health issues.104  Modern debtors’ prisons financially 
burden whole families already struggling in economically 
underdeveloped communities.105  This cycle also deprives 
 
101.  Id.  
102.  Id.  See also In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 10.  That is, unless the offender 
is imprisoned for nonpayment of superior court LFO’s.  Washington’s DP, supra note 
93, at 9.  Some states impose additional per diem incarceration fees, which add to the 
individual’s overall balance.  See supra Bannon, supra note 39, at 23; supra text 
accompanying note 66. 
103.  Kainaz Amaria et al., Profiles of Those Forced to ‘Pay or Stay’, NPR (May 
19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/310710716/profiles-of-those-forced-
to-pay-or-stay [https://perma.cc/WQ4Y-UGLB]; In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
104.  Lillian Thomas, Poor Health: Poverty and Scarce Resources in U.S. Cities; 
Part One: The Problem, POST-GAZETTE.COM, http://newsinteractive.post-gazette.com/
longform/stories/poorhealth/1/ [http://perma.cc/C2UH-VMC9].  In Jennings, Missouri, 
another target of a debtors’ prison suit, jail conditions cause psychological and physical 
damage.  See Class Action Complaint at ¶ 3, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-
00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YA58-QVQP].  Inmates have committed, and attempted, suicide in the Jennings jail 
“after being confined solely because they did not have enough money to buy their 
freedom.”  Id.; see also Margaret Gillerman & Joel Currier, Jennings Hanging Attempt 
is Latest in Series of Area Jail Incidents, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/jennings-hanging-attempt-is-
latest-in-series-of-area-jail/article_a62642ad-141b-5b5c-9881-6ec2a67290f8.html [http:// 
perma.cc/XL2X-NRKK]; Joseph Shapiro, Jail Time for Unpaid Court Fines and Fees 
Can Create Cycle of Poverty, NPR (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:38 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02/09/384968360/jail-time-for-unpaid-
court-fines-and-fees-can-create-cycle-of-poverty [http://perma.cc/KC8A-ZEKS]; 
Jessica Pishko, Locked Up for Being Poor, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/locked-up-for-being-poor/386069/ 
[http://perma.cc/8NEC-HHHC]. 
105.  When LFOs are imposed on individuals who are unable to pay, his or her 
family faces a difficult choice: “[m]any poor defendants and their families prioritize 
paying a fine in order to avoid incarceration, and to do so must forgo paying for 
essentials such as rent or food.”  Louisiana’s DP, supra note 39 at 6; see also Roopal 
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communities of economic contributions to the labor market as 
imprisonment disrupts an individual’s time spent in, or searching 
for, gainful employment.106  Even with stable employment, legal 
debt drains an individual’s long-term finances for decades to 
come.107  Thus, the debtors’ prison undercuts criminal debtors’ 
abilities to work toward repayment and cripples their opportunities 
for advancement.108  As a result, some individuals may turn, or 
return, if the case may be, to engaging in criminal behavior as a way 
to support themselves, their families, and to repay their LFOs.109 
Municipalities focused entirely on generating revenue often 
employ their police forces and court operations to collect from the 
most vulnerable citizens, often poor people of color.110  In 
Ferguson, Missouri, a 2015 Department of Justice investigation111 
uncovered that African Americans were disproportionately more 
likely to be ticketed and arrested for minor offenses, for which they 
were sixty-eight percent less likely to have their charges 
dismissed.112  The Ferguson debtors’ prison113 reflects the City’s 
“unlawful bias against and stereotypes about African 
Americans,”114 which demonstrates an unconstitutional violation of 
their equal protection rights.115  This racial disparity characterizes 
the modern debtors’ prison and, in essence, creates a “two-tiered 
 
Patel & Meghna Philip, Criminal Justice Debt: A Toolkit for Action, BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. 7 (2012), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/2012-Brennan-Toolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/PBF6-APB4]. 
106.  Patel, supra note 105, at 6; see also Meredith Kleykamp et al., Wasting 
Money, Wasting Lives: Calculating the Hidden Costs of Incarceration in New Jersey, 
DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE 9 (2008), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
WMWL_Final_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6WL-RHU2].  Further, having an arrest, 
conviction, or jail stay on a person’s record makes finding employment difficult.  
Harris, supra note 52, at 1777–78.  Only 48% of the Washington individuals involved in 
this study were employed at the time.  Id. 
107.  Harris, supra note 52, at 1776.  Incarceration, even for three or four days, 
forces already economically disadvantaged individuals to miss shifts at work or changes 
their reputation in the workplace. 
108.  THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS 
WHITE PAPER 25–26 (2014), http://03a5010.netsolhost.com/WordPress/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/ArchCity-Defenders-Municipal-Courts-Whitepaper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QP97-WCDP]. 
109.  Harris, supra note 52, at 1785. 
110.  See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 57, at 2–4. 
111.  See materials supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
112.  FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 57, at 4–5. 
113.  Id. at 8–9. 
114.  Id. at 5.  
115.  Id. at 63. 
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system of justice” along racial lines.116 
5. Reform Efforts: Litigation and Proposed Legislation 
Civil rights advocates such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”), the Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”), 
and Equal Justice Under Law (“EJUL”) have seen some successes 
in challenging the modern debtors’ prison on the basis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment violations.117  In Montgomery, Alabama, 
for example, EJUL obtained an injunction, and later, a settlement 
with the City, which reformed the entire criminal justice system and 
altered the City’s approach to criminal debtors.118 
Following the publication of its Ferguson report,119 the 
Department of Justice under the Obama administration announced 
a package of resources to aid local reform efforts, including $2.5 
million in competitive grants to “restructure the assessment and 
enforcement of fines and fees.”120  The department also proposed 
reform strategies founded on due process and equal protection 
principles, including adhering to the Bearden rule and developing 
meaningful alternatives to incarceration.121  However, reiteration of 
 
116.  In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 10; FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra 
note 78, at 1. 
117.  See, e.g., SPLC Lawsuit Closes Debtors’ Prison in Alabama Capital, SPLC: 
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2014/08/26/splc-lawsuit-closes-
debtors’-prison-alabama-capital [http://perma.cc/G8SA-Z2NM].  
118.  See Shutting Down Debtors’ Prisons, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., http:// 
equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-debtors-prisons/ [http:// perma.cc/
PV9B-HVXP. 
119.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
120.  Justice Department Announces Resources to Assist State and Local 
Reform of Fine and Fee Practices, DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-resources-assist-state-
and-local-reform-fine-and-fee-practices [http://perma.cc/45UW-7DCS]; see also Matt 
Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Condemns Profit-Minded Court Policies Targeting the Poor, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/us/politics/justice-
dept-condemns-profit-minded-court-policies-targeting-the-poor.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/7CS5-QF3L]. 
121.  See generally Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, Dear Colleague, DEP’T OF JUST. 
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download [https://perma.cc/
7EYH-2YFQ].  The state of these efforts remains unclear in the early days of the 
Trump administration, although on March 17, 2017, the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights held a briefing assessing state and local fine and fee practices since the Obama-
era Dear Colleague letter.  See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOTICE OF 
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pre-existing Fourteenth Amendment safeguards, which have failed 
to prevent modern debtors’ prisons from emerging,122 provides no 
guarantees of adequate protection from desperately underfunded 
municipalities with deep-seated racial biases.123  As Congress’s 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce 
Clause124 continue to be restricted through regressive Supreme 
Court decisions, they will likely soon be unavailable as sources of 
remedies for future violations.125 
In January, 2016, Representative Mark Takano and civil rights 
organizations such as the ACLU, SPLC, and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”), 
advanced a bill called the “End of Debtor’s Prison Act of 2016,” 
which died in committee.126  If it had been enacted, the bill would 
have withdrawn federal funding from states or municipalities that 
contract with private probation companies127 as a means of 
collecting unpaid fines and fees from “pay-only” probationers.128  
This was a meaningful effort, which was the result of consistent 
investigation and advocacy.129  However, this bill isolated only one 
particular practice—states’ contracting with private probation 
companies—that gives rise to the modern debtors’ prison, and, as 
this Note argues, such attempts will not effectively dismantle the 
full range of this complex institution. 
The roots of the modern debtors’ prison are extensive and 
require dynamic strategies capable of achieving systemic change.130  
The Thirteenth Amendment, albeit currently underutilized in the 
movement against the modern debtors’ prison, holds powerful 
promises as a source of substantive rights and protections for 
 
122.  Shapiro, supra note 20.   
123.  FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 4–7. 
124.  See infra note 150. 
125.  See infra Section II.D.3. 
126.  See generally End of Debtor’s Prisons Act of 2016, H.R. 4364, 114th Cong. 
(2016); Letter of Support for the “End of Debtor’s Prison Act of 2016”, SPLC (Mar. 16, 
2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/final_letter_of_support_for_the_
end_of_debtors_prison_act_of_2016.pdf [https:// perma.cc/P3Y5-H85J]. 
127.  See supra Section I.B.1. 
128.  Defined as “an individual who is placed on probation due to the failure of 
the individual to pay any part of a fine or fee imposed by a State or local court.”  End 
of Debtor’s Prisons Act of 2016, H.R. 4364, 114th Cong. § 2(h)(2) (2016). 
129.  See generally Letter of Support for the “End of Debtor’s Prison Act of 
2016,” supra note 126. 
130.  See Atkinson, supra note 35, at 202. 
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criminal debtors.131  The next Section will delve more deeply into 
the law governing rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
II. THE HISTORY, PROMISES, AND IMPACT OF THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.  Section 2.  Congress shall have 
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.132 
Slavery in Confederate states was abolished on January 1, 
1863, when President Lincoln issued the Emancipation 
Proclamation.133  Ratified in 1865, section one of the Thirteenth 
Amendment implemented emancipation throughout the United 
States, and section two gave Congress powers to enforce section 
one “by appropriate legislation.”134  The Thirteenth Amendment’s 
immediate and prospective purpose was to uproot slavery, in all its 
forms.135  The Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment included 
slavery and involuntary servitude, both terms in need of 
interpretation, allowing the Amendment to adapt and remain 
flexible to new and unforeseen factual scenarios.136  Each 
independent element of the Thirteenth Amendment—the promises 
held within section one and section two’s grant of enforcement 
powers—requires separate analyses. 
A. Slavery under Thirteenth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The “traditional form” of slavery, as it has existed in this 
country, was the institution of chattel slavery perpetrated against 
African American people.137  It was a characteristically brutal, 
 
131.  See TSESIS 2004, supra note 23. 
132.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
133.  The Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 3; McAward 2010, supra note 
21, at 85. 
134.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
135.  Tsesis 2009, supra note 22, at 1337–38; Joseph W. Mark, Comment, United 
States v. Hatch: The Significance of the Thirteenth Amendment in Contemporary 
American Jurisprudence, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 693, 697 (2014). 
136.  Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional 
Amendment in Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 374 (1995). 
137.  Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 869, 883 (2012). 
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dehumanizing status of legal ownership that attached to a person 
for life.138  Most notably, slavery effectuated the forced laborer’s 
social death, meaning “the alienation or exclusion of the slave from 
the community at large justified by the general unworthiness of the 
slave.”139  Interpretations of “slavery” within the context of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, however, struggled to determine whether 
the legal institution of chattel slavery was a starting point for 
applying the prohibition, or a limiting factor on what practices 
could be prohibited as “slavery.”140  Early Supreme Court 
interpretations, the Slaughter-House Cases141 and the Civil Rights 
Cases,142 for example, rendered Congress’s section two 
enforcement power under the Amendment weak and insufficient.143  
Under these interpretations, Congress could determine the “badges 
and incidents of slavery,”144 but only as they emerge through State 
action perpetuating slavery.145 
However, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court restored 
Congress’s expansive power to “rationally . . . determine what are 
 
138.  Id. at 883–85. 
139.  Id. at 886 (arguing legal and social forces accomplish this consequence of 
slavery—removing slaves from the community at large and imposing upon them a 
badge of inferiority). 
140.  In other words, the debate has surrounded whether the practice at issue 
must resemble “traditional” chattel slavery in order to trigger Thirteenth Amendment 
protections, or if the Framers would have permitted Congress to consider practices 
which radically differ from, albeit are analogous to, chattel slavery.  See id. at 883. 
141.  83 U.S. 36 (1873) (considering whether compelling butchers to work in 
slaughterhouses was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment; concluding that it was 
not).  Here, the Court defines slavery as a “‘legalized social relation’ and just as quickly 
found that slavery was over following the Civil War.”  Armstrong, supra note 137, at 
878. 
142.  109 U.S. 3 (1883).  The Court in Civil Rights Cases decided neither the 
Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amendment justified Congress’s enactment of section 
one of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  This provision entitled all persons, “regardless of 
any previous condition of servitude,” the “full and equal enjoyment of” public sites of 
amusement.  Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 582–84 (2012) [hereinafter McAward 2012]. 
143.  See TSESIS 2004, supra note 23, at 74. 
144.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. 
145.  See McAward 2012, supra note 142, at 582–83.  Justice Harlan’s scalding 
dissent demonstrated a much broader view of Congressional authority.  He argued 
Congress is “not necessarily restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution 
upheld by positive law, but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the 
liberated race against discrimination, in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen, 
where such discrimination is based upon race.”  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 37 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Tsesis 2009, supra note 22 at 1342; McAward 2012, 
supra note 142, at 586–88. 
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the badges and the incidents of slavery, and [conferred] the 
authority to translate that determination into effective 
legislation.”146  Under Jones, courts should simply defer to 
Congress’s rational determination of the “badges and incidents of 
slavery,”147 which, in practicality, extended Congress’s section two 
enforcement power to bar “badges and incidents” of slavery in 
public and private instances of racial discrimination.148  The Jones 
rule has largely governed Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence to 
this day,149 despite calls for more definitive guidance from the 
Supreme Court.150 
 
146.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 
147.  Id.  See also Mark, supra note 135, at 699. 
148.  Jones, 392 U.S. at 442–43 (“[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into 
ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it 
too is a relic of slavery.”). 
149.  In United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d. Cir. 2002), the court 
interpreted Jones as allowing Congress to extend Thirteenth Amendment protections 
to a broader range of activities than race-based slavery or involuntary servitude.  In 
Nelson, the defendants in a Jewish hate crime case questioned Congress’s authority to 
enact 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) of the Hate Crimes Act.  This section “makes it a 
federal crime for a person (even if acting in a purely private capacity) to injure 
someone else because of the victim’s race or religion and because the victim was 
enjoying a public facility provided by any State or local government.”  Nelson, 277 F.3d 
at 174.  The Court upheld the statute; it reasoned that the essential quality of slavery or 
involuntary servitude, “the subjugation of one person to another by coercive means,” 
can be effectuated on individuals irrespective of their race.  Id. at 179. 
150.  The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013) 
condoned targeted racial violence as a rational determination of “badges and 
incidents” of slavery within Congress’s power to regulate.  See Mark, supra note 135, at 
705.  Specifically, the court upheld the Hate Crimes Act of 2009, which added racial 
violence as an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 249.  However, the court implored the 
Supreme Court “to bring Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence in line with the 
structural concerns that prompted limits . . . announced in City of Boerne, Lopez, and 
Morrison,” all cases restraining Constitutionally-created Congressional enforcement 
power.  Mark, supra note 135, at 706.  See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000) (holding Congress was not permitted to enact the Violence Against Women 
Act under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
passed under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, exceeded Congress’s 
enforcement powers under the Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (holding that passage of the Gun-Free School Zones Act was an impermissible 
reach of Congress under its Commerce Clause authority).  At least two other Circuits 
and one District Court have also upheld the racial violence provision of 18 U.S.C. § 249 
under Jones, while echoing Hatch’s call for restrained Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement power.  See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 709 (2014); United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Henery, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (D. Idaho 2014).  
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B. Involuntary Servitude under Thirteenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary 
servitude has also undergone interpretive challenges.151  Often 
conflated, courts have long recognized that “[t]he words 
involuntary servitude have a ‘larger meaning than slavery.’”152  
Courts have attempted to define involuntary servitude primarily in 
the criminal, rather than the civil context.153  The Supreme Court 
held, in United States v. Kozminski,154 
[a]bsent change by Congress, . . . for purposes of criminal 
prosecution under § 241 or § 1584,155 the term “involuntary 
servitude” necessarily means a condition of servitude in which 
the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or 
threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or 
threat of coercion through the law or the legal process.156 
 
151.  See Kares, supra note 136, at 386–92. 
152.  Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (quoting Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872)); Milwaukee v. Horvath, 143 N.W.2d 446, 448 (1966).  
Although slavery and involuntary servitude are often conflated, involuntary servitude, 
subtly distinguished from slavery, is “forced labor for the benefit of another.”  See 
Armstrong, supra note 137 (citing Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)).  In 
other words, involuntary servitude originates out of extralegal methods—either 
physical force or legal coercion—whereas the compulsion to labor in slavery originates 
from and is reinforced by a legal framework.  Id. at 882–86. 
153.  This is because statutes enforcing this Thirteenth Amendment prohibition 
have criminalized activity that returns individuals to conditions of involuntary 
servitude.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–88; see also Kares, supra note 136, at 384–85.  Courts 
proclaim that the necessity of providing a criminal definition is because due process 
requires notice of activities that carry criminal sanctions.  United States v. Kozminski, 
487 U.S. 931, 949–50 (1988); Kares, supra note 136, at 388. 
154.  Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.  
155.  18 U.S.C. § 241 prohibits conspiracies to interfere with constitutionally-
guaranteed rights, including those provided in the Thirteenth Amendment, whereas 
§ 1584 is intended to narrowly criminalize the holding of a person to involuntary 
servitude.  Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 940.   
156.  Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952 (reversing convictions for involuntary servitude 
where defendants held two mentally handicapped farmworkers laboring “in poor 
health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation” using psychological coercion).  
This definition of involuntary servitude drew criticism from Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, who would have preferred a definition of servitude focusing on the “slavelike 
condition[s]” imposed, rather than the method of coercion.  Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 964 
(Brennan, J., concurring); see William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth 
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The Kozminski rule allows courts to determine whether the 
conduct at issue imposes “‘slavelike’ conditions of servitude” 
through “physical or legal coercion.”157  While this narrow 
definition for purposes of criminal sanctions was not intended to 
“define involuntary servitude in its constitutional sense,”158 lower 
courts nevertheless regularly apply it in the civil context.159  This 
involves considering whether the victim only had the choice 
between performing the labor, or receiving physical or legal 
sanctions.160 
C. The Thirteenth Amendment’s Exception for “Crimes Duly 
Convicted” 
The Thirteenth Amendment is not an absolute prohibition; its 
exception allows for involuntary servitude or slavery “as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted.”161  The Supreme Court has held that this exception does 
not apply to laws that have regulatory, or non-punitive purposes.162  
For example, collateral consequence laws, or regulatory sanctions, 
which attach to criminal convictions163 and arguably effectuate a 
similar social death as experienced in slavery164—such as sex 
offender registration—do not constitute punishment.165  Simply 
 
Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1311, 1337 (2007); Kares, supra note 136, at 389.  
157.  Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 951 (emphasis added).  A court cannot find non-
“slavelike” conditions so intolerable as to constitute involuntary servitude, as this 
would impermissibly substitute the court’s “value judgment” for that of Congress.  Id. 
at 950.  Nor does the rule allow for psychological coercion, which would hinge its 
meaning “entirely upon the victim’s state of mind.”  Id. at 949. 
158.  Kares, supra note 136, at 389 (emphasis omitted). 
159.  Id. 
160.  Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District, 987 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1993). 
161.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
162.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003); see Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil 
Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 
1808 (2012).  
163.  See generally Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence—Understanding 
Collateral Consequences, 272 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 25 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/241927.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAV4-6MJS]. 
164.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
165.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 (holding registration systems for convicted sex 
offenders is purely regulatory, not punitive, for purposes of the constitution’s 
prohibition against retroactive punishment); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, The Ironic 
Promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for Offender Anti-Discrimination Law, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1180 (2013). 
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having the mere presence of a deterrent purpose does not render 
the sanctions criminal, since “[a]ny number of governmental 
programs might deter crime without imposing punishment.”166  
Therefore, it is unconstitutional if the State imposes slavery or 
involuntary servitude on a defendant for a primary purpose other 
than to further its punitive goals.167 
D. The Practice of Peonage and the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 
Following the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery, 
wealthy white plantation (and former slave) owners faced, among 
others, an economic dilemma: how would they continue to 
maintain their expansive farming enterprises, which designedly 
required the exploitation of black labor?168  Under the vague 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude, 
the institution of peonage arose as a means of sidestepping the 
Amendment’s prohibition.169  Peonage is the voluntary or 
involuntary arrangement to engage in compulsory service to 
another for the repayment of debt.170 
1. The Conduct of Peonage: Compulsory Labor 
One solution to Southern plantation owners’ economic 
dilemma171 was to coerce freed slaves into signing “lifetime” labor 
contracts by the threat of torture and death.172  These labor 
arrangements were flush with provisions nearly identical to those 
conditions inherent in the institution of slavery.173  Freed Blacks in 
 
166.  Smith, 538 U.S. at 102. 
167.  See Chin, supra note 162. 
168.  See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 
26–27 (Doubleday, 2008). 
169.  For a particularly thorough description of the historical and legal 
background of peonage, see Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1609–26. 
170.  Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905). 
171.  See Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1609–26. 
172.  See BLACKMON, supra note 168.  A seedier intention may have existed; 
“[b]ecause of the tremendous upheaval after freedom, both Southern planters and the 
federal government believed that blacks needed close supervision.”  PETE DANIEL, 
THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901–1969 19 (U. Ill. Press 
1972). 
173.  See BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 27.  Although many of these contracts 
were dissolved, they helped to form a tactical strategy of southern whites seeking to 
regain their slave-labor base, and thus to return to their tremendous prosperity and 
comfort of pre-war life.  See id. 
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the South—especially formerly enslaved agricultural workers174—
hardly had another alternative than to agree to such contracts, 
since Southern states passed vagrancy laws which required them to 
prove their employment or risk imprisonment.175  Once convicted 
and labeled a ‘criminal,’ the Thirteenth Amendment rights of 
African Americans were essentially nullified, as involuntary 
servitude was permissible “for crime[s] . . . duly convicted.”176  
Submitting to these labor contracts voluntarily might have 
appeared preferable compared to the cruel system of convict 
leasing to which African Americans were subjected once 
imprisoned.177  If not imprisoned and sold into forced labor to 
private companies,178 black defendants facing fines for petty 
offenses would agree to work for sureties, or, private employers 
who satisfied their criminal debts.179 
The prohibition against compulsory labor under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and as implemented by the Peonage Act, 
indicated Congress sought to “maintain a system of completely free 
and voluntary labor.”180  While some instances of forced labor were 
constitutionally acceptable, such as penal labor,181 Congress 
precluded a State from making joblessness an element of any 
 
174.  See DANIEL, supra note 172, at 19–20.  This particular class of former 
slaves, following Emancipation, had no land or capital with which to create their own 
livelihoods.  Id. at 20.  Therefore, becoming indebted to a landowner from whom they 
rented land for crops, or sharecropping contracts, became a prime opportunity for 
economic prosperity.  Id.  Sharecropping contracts allowed a former slave to work a 
parcel of land, and in return, would share portions of the crop with the supply merchant 
or planter.  Id.  A sharecropper who received advances for his work would become 
indebted to the landowner, which was considered a breach of his contract—a criminal 
act at that time.  See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme 
Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
646, 651 (1982). 
175.  Between the late 1860s and 1877, vagrancy laws sprung up in every 
Southern state.  BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 53.  As an example, in Mississippi, an 
1865 statute “required African American workers to enter into labor contracts with 
white farmers by January 1 of every year or risk arrest.”  Id. at 53; see also Birckhead, 
supra note 48, at 1611 (chronicling the rise and breadth of these Black Codes). 
176.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see Schmidt, supra note 174, at 649.  
177.  Schmidt, supra note 174, at 653. 
178.  BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 51–53. 
179.  Schmidt, supra note 174, at 653; DANIEL, supra note 172, at 19–20; see also 
Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 674–75 (M.D. Ala. 1903).  Even child defendants processed 
in probate court could be judicially returned to their former masters.  Schmidt, supra 
note 174, at 650. 
180.  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). 
181.  See infra Section III.A.1. 
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crime.182  Essentially, it is “beyond debate that no indebtedness 
warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory 
service” by virtue of these two federal laws.183 
2. The Purpose of Peonage: Repayment of Debt 
One fact existed universally: all were indebted to their masters.  
This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their masters’ 
service . . . .  Upon entering the new service, or while continuing 
therein, the peon was held rigorously to fulfill his pledge and 
render his labor so long as his debts remained, or an additional 
one was incurred.184 
Once indebted to these private employers, either by virtue of 
voluntarily undertaking a labor contract185 or being involuntarily 
thrust into a surety contract,186 the peon was compelled to labor 
until his debt was liquidated—a task which often became 
impossible due to endless additional debts tacked onto the peon’s 
growing tab.187 
3. The Enforcement of Peonage: Through Custom and Law 
Although “true crime was almost trivial in most places,”188 
Black Codes, and by extension, peonage, emerged during a 
southern conservative “redemption” campaign, which sought to 
reverse the movement toward equality.189  The campaign was 
bolstered by the belief southern whites had in their proprietary 
interest in their former slaves.190 
Once created, peonage enlisted southern officers of the law, at 
nearly every level, to replicate and enforce this system of pseudo-
enslavement.191  State legislatures in the South created laws 
permitting arrest, fines, and imprisonment for petty misdemeanors 
or breaches of labor contracts.192  Local sheriffs and justices of the 
 
182.  Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18; see Schmidt, supra note 174, at 649. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194 (1857). 
185.  See supra text related to labor contracts accompanying note 172–73. 
186.  See supra text related to surety contracts accompanying note 179. 
187.  See Schmidt, supra note 174, at 653. 
188.  BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 69. 
189.  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 30–31 (The New Press, 2010). 
190.  Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1610. 
191.  Schmidt, supra note 174, at 650. 
192.  See Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1606. 
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peace, entitled to partial payments of fees collected from 
defendants, also implicated themselves in this system of perverse 
incentives.193  Much more involved in debt enforcement than public 
safety, law enforcement and judges operated as a team to provide 
private companies with a supply of labor by way of surety 
contracts, or convict leasing,194 and fill their coffers “with the 
bounty extracted” from freed slaves-turned-peons.195  “Swift, 
uncomplicated adjudication was the key to the system,” since, 
revenue increased when defendants had limited, or no, access to 
lawyers or information related to their debts.196 
Additionally, once a person became a peon either voluntarily 
or involuntarily, the law functioned as a trap, holding him to labor 
until he satisfied the debt.197  Courts recognized the peon “could 
not abandon the service and if he did, his master pursued, 
reclaimed, and reduced him to obedience and labor again;” 
returning peons to their creditors was encoded within state statutes 
that criminalized the breach of these labor contracts.198 
4. Backlash against Peonage: The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 
The institution of peonage, as assessed in 1846, trapped “a 
large class of persons . . . who were not ‘of any particular color, 
race, or caste.’”199  The Thirteenth Amendment, on its own, had 
little teeth to curb this extensive practice.200  In response, the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, despite the Thirteenth Amendment 
 
193.  BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 61–69.   
194.  Id. at 65–66 (“Increasingly, it was a system driven not by any goal of 
enforcement or public protection against serious offenses, but purely to generate fees 
and claim bounties.”). 
195.  Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1624. 
196.  BLACKMON, supra note 168, at 66. 
197.  Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1903). 
198.  Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194 (1857). 
199.  DANIEL, supra note 172, at 15.  The system of peonage was not restricted to 
former slaves, nor was it defined along racial lines.  Peonage, developed in Spain, was 
first practiced in the United States territory of New Mexico.  Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 
673–74.  Freed slaves in the “cotton belt” were especially vulnerable to the practice due 
to the “enduring plantation system” and the persistence of “[p]overty, illiteracy,” and 
oppression within the southern states.  DANIEL, supra note 172 at 21.  See also 
Hampson, supra note 7, at 30.   
200.  See Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually 
Forgotten Prohibition of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1618 (2012). 
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containing no reference to peonage,201 harnessed its section two 
enforcement powers to pass the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867.202  The 
civil provision forbids “[t]he holding of any person to service or 
labor” and “declared null and void” any State laws that 
“establish[ed], maintain[ed], or enforce[d], directly or indirectly, 
the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as 
peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation.”203  This civil 
component was intended to prohibit, without any exception204 
(unlike the Thirteenth Amendment), voluntary or involuntary 
peonage.205  The criminal provision penalized individuals found 
“hold[ing] or return[ing] any person to a condition of peonage, or 
arrest[ing] any person with the intent of placing him in or returning 
him to a condition of peonage.”206  Since the Peonage Act forbids 
any compulsory labor for the purpose of repayment of debt, even 
following a criminal conviction—in fact, raising a violation of the 
Peonage Act was a valid defense to a state conviction for contract 
breach207—under no circumstances may an individual be held in a 
condition of peonage.208 
III. MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS—MODERN VIOLATIONS OF 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE ANTI-PEONAGE ACT 
Imprisonment to compel payment of costs is involuntary 
servitude and repugnant to the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
 
201.  Some interpretations call peonage a “classic example” of involuntary 
servitude “whereby the poor were forced to labor until their debt was satisfied,” which 
is therefore encompassed within the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on 
involuntary servitude.  See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 137, at 883–84; 45 AM. JUR 2D 
Involuntary Servitude § 15 (2016); see also Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942); 
Gross, supra note 52, at 178.  Others conclude peonage is the condition of involuntary 
servitude with the added element of performance for liquidation of debt.  United States 
v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 481 n.9 (2d Cir. 1964).  In any case, the Peonage Act, in both 
its criminal and civil provisions, has been widely held as a valid Congressional Act 
under the Thirteenth Amendment.  
202.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2015).  See also Soifer, supra note 200, at 1616–17; 
McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 86–87. 
203.  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2015). 
204.  Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 676. 
205.  See Soifer, supra note 200, at 1618–19 (“The Peonage Act’s protections 
even stretched beyond the traditional definition of peonage anchored in debt or 
obligation; the new statute would also reach obligations ‘otherwise’ imposed.”).  Id. 
206.  18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2015).  
207.  Schmidt, supra note 174, at 654.  For other Peonage Act remedies, see infra 
Section III.C. 
208.  See Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 676.  
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United States Constitution and thus is, in my considered 
opinion, illegal.  The lack of money, in and of itself, should 
never be the cause of imprisonment in our humane society.209 
The modern debtors’ prison forces individuals into a creditor-
debtor relationship with a municipality or a private probation 
corporation that purchases the debt.210  Forced to repay their 
indebtedness by any means necessary, criminal debtors are offered 
no alternative but to satisfy their debt in state-prescribed forms of 
labor.  Failure to do so results in imprisonment.  This is an 
unconstitutional condition of peonage that is prohibited by the 
Thirteenth Amendment and enforced through the Anti-Peonage 
Act.  Together, these laws promise a federally-guaranteed right to 
be free from compulsory labor, and they must be called upon to 
provide immediate remedies and a source of congressional action 
to create lasting reform. 
A. The Modern Debtors’ Prison is Peonage in Violation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Anti-Peonage Act 
As explored in Section II.B., the modern debtors’ prison arises 
in a multiplicity of ways that differ between each municipality in 
which they exist.  However, when considering the salient features 
of each, it becomes clear that the modern debtors’ prison is an 
impermissible and unconstitutional form of modern-day peonage.211 
1. Individuals Caught in the Modern Debtors’ Prison are 
Forced into Compulsory Labor 
Compulsory labor212 in the modern debtors prison is 
performed in several ways.213  For individuals in a “pay-or-stay” 
 
209.  Wilson v. Sloan, 438 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968). 
210.  See supra Section I.B. 
211.  See Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 676; Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1655–62 
(drawing parallels between the modern day debtors’ prison and the old form of 
peonage in both the criminal justice and juvenile justice realm). 
212.  See supra Section I.C.4.a.; see also Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194 
(1857); DANIEL, supra note 172, at 15–16. 
213.  This is distinguished from labor required of inmates in prison (“penal 
labor”), where imprisonment is the statutorily imposed punishment for a crime—labor 
being a component of that punishment.  See, e.g., Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 
(9th Cir. 1963).  Penal labor is a constitutionally permitted form of involuntary 
servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception.  See id.  Alternatively, the 
modern debtors’ prison presents a unique scenario where debt is imposed by virtue of 
appearing as a criminal defendant for a minor municipal offense, and imprisonment or 
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jurisdiction,214 the labor is a criminal debtor’s imprisonment (i.e., 
“sitting” off their debt), if they are unable to pay up front, which 
essentially earns their freedom over time.215  In other 
municipalities, jail time arbitrarily decreases fines and fees over 
time.216  For example, in Jennings, Missouri, Ms. Allison Nelson 
was put on a payment plan of $100 per month for fines and costs 
from traffic tickets assessed with no meaningful inquiry into her 
ability to pay;217 when she missed payments, she was imprisoned an 
unspecified number of times between 2011 and 2013.218  On one of 
these occasions, in November of 2013, jail staff told her she would 
not be released unless she paid $1,000, which she told them she 
could not pay.219  After four days, she was informed that her release 
amount would be lowered to $100—the guard apparently felt 
generous because it was Thanksgiving.220  Seeing “release amounts” 
decrease over time indicates these individuals essentially buy 
themselves closer to freedom the longer they stay in jail.221 
For other individuals, being required to complete a mandatory 
number of community service hours is a form of compulsory 
“working off” LFO debt; failure to complete these hours, even if 
they were imposed without regard to the likelihood they could be 
completed, results in imprisonment.222  A particularly striking 
parallel to earlier forms of peonage exists in Jackson, Mississippi, 
 
community service is ordered as a form of repayment of that debt.  See Atkinson, supra 
note 35, at 202, 207. 
214.  See FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 6; supra text 
accompanying note 99. 
215.  See Complaint at 9–10, Foster v. City of Alexander City, No. 3:15-cv-00647-
WKW (M.D. Ala Sept. 8, 2015), 2015 WL 5256630; Complaint, Thompson v. DeKalb 
Cty., No. 1:15-mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/assets/2015.01.29_filed_thompson_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5W8-
BN58]. 
216.  See Class Action Complaint at 7–9, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-
00252 (E.D. Mo. 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/
02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YA58-QVQP]. 
217.  See supra Section I.B.2. 
218.  Class Action Complaint at 26–28, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-
00252 (E.D. Mo. 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/
02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YA58-QVQP]. 
219.  Id. at 27. 
220.  Id. 
221.  See supra Section I.B.3. 
222.  In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 8–9; see supra Section I.B.2. 
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where criminal debtors perform agricultural labor at the Penal 
Farm to repay their LFOs.223  Criminal debtors there have the 
“choice” to “sit out” their debt in the Hinds County Jail for twenty-
five dollars per day, or “work off” their debts at the Penal Farm for 
fifty-eight dollars per day.224 
Other criminal debtors are on payment plans and must work 
to repay their debts to either the municipality or a private 
probation corporation; falling behind by even one payment results 
in threats of, or actual, imprisonment.225  One such individual, Mr. 
Reynaud Variste in New Orleans, Louisiana, managed to pay down 
his $1600 court fees to $700 over several years, but when his 
construction work slowed and he fell behind, police officers armed 
with assault rifles raided his family home and arrested him for 
overdue court fees.226  For three days he sat in jail until his 
girlfriend relinquished his entire paycheck to the Collections 
Department to pay his LFO balance.227 
Criminal debtors are offered no alternative but repayment of 
LFO debt by one of these various forms of “labor.”  They are not 
afforded an opportunity to waive fees due to their indigency;228 they 
are not offered reasonable community service alternatives to 
incarceration;229 no opportunity exists to create a reasonable 
payment plan based on their income.230  Clearly municipalities 
engaging in these practices have violated the heart of criminal 
debtors’ right to be free from compulsory labor.  Labor is required 
to satisfy LFO debts; failure to do so is a criminal act.231 
It may be tempting to identify elements of “choice” in the 
aforementioned stories.  For example, in Jackson, individuals may 
choose to “sit off” their fees in jail or work at the Penal Farm, opt 
 
223.  See generally Class Action Complaint, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-
732-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015), 2015 WL 5949208.  
224.  Id. at 2–3.  
225.  See, e.g., SPLC Lawsuit Closes Debtors’ Prison in Alabama Capital, supra 
note 117.   
226.  First Amended Class Action Complaint, Cain v. City of New Orleans at 14–
15, No. 2:15-cv-04479-SSV-JCW (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2015), http://
equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/First-Amended-Complaint-9-
22-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EAV-WGBN]. 
227.  Id. 
228.  Bannon, supra note 39, at 13. 
229.  Id. at 15–17. 
230.  Id. at 14–15. 
231.  See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); see supra Section I.B.3. 
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to receive 500 hours of community service, or set up a payment 
plan to satisfy LFO debt incrementally over time.232  Faced with 
insurmountable fees and endless threats of being jailed for 
nonpayment, the choice to pay court fees, by any means necessary, 
over basic necessities is no choice at all.233  Under the prohibition 
against peonage, however, whether compulsory labor is voluntary 
or involuntary is of no consequence; any compulsory labor to 
liquidate debt is exhaustively prohibited.234 
2. The Purpose of Compulsory Labor in the Modern 
Debtors’ Prison is Repayment of Debt 
The purpose of labor in the modern debtors’ prison scheme, as 
discussed above, is to satisfy the indebtedness to the creditor.235  
Starved-for-cash, municipalities exploit low-income people through 
their criminal justice fine and fee schedules.  The underlying basis 
of the fine and fee schedules is to fill drained local coffers, not to 
enforce its criminal provisions or to serve a legitimate purpose of 
punishment.236 
Imprisonment is not imposed in the debtors’ prison because it 
fulfills the municipality’s need to punish citizens for their crimes, 
which would be constitutional.237  Instead, the imprisonment is 
intended to satisfy the debt or to compel the debtor to seek his 
outside resources to repay the debt.238  Under this system, serving 
time takes on a new meaning—rather than repaying one’s debt to 
society, a valid form of punishment,239 the criminal debtor serves 
his time for the economic benefit of the municipal body to which he 
 
232.  See generally Class Action Complaint at 6, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-
cv-732-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015), 2015 WL 5949208.  
233.  “I’ve had judges tell me that they don’t care what my other obligations are, 
LFOs come first.  First before anything.  First before food and shelter,” stated David 
Ramirez, a father of four supporting his family on his sole income from public 
assistance.  Washington’s DP, supra note 93, at 13.  
234.  See supra Section II.D.4. 
235.  See Washington’s DP, supra note 93, at 8–9. 
236.  See Bronner, supra note 40.   
237.  Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
238.  For example, Ms. Samantha Jenkins, a forty-seven-year-old mother of six 
relied on her family to borrow and raise $300 from “friends and relatives to buy her out 
of jail.”  Class Action Complaint at 8, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252 
(E.D. Mo. 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA58-
QVQP]. 
239.  See, e.g., Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963). 
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is indebted.240  Community service, rather than providing an 
alternative to repayment, serves essentially the same function of 
repaying debt solely intended to fill local coffers.241  Whether the 
municipality retains the debt or a private probation corporation has 
purchased it, failure to repay the creditor results in imprisonment 
until it is “paid off.”242  The prohibition against peonage forbids 
compulsory labor to satisfy indebtedness, and thus prohibits 
municipalities from relying on criminal debtors for their labor.243 
3. The Enforcement of the Modern Debtors’ Prison through 
Custom and Law 
The criminal debtor’s status as a peon is enforced by the full 
force of the municipal legal system, which takes no accounting of 
his ability to repay his debt.244  Salient throughout these stories is a 
recurring theme, and one which is characteristic of the modern 
debtors’ prison:245 criminal debtors in these municipalities are 
denied basic due process rights, including the opportunity to be 
heard on their inability to pay.246  Similar to the original system of 
peonage,247 in the modern debtors’ prison, municipalities maximize 
their revenue collection when defendants are not provided an 
attorney or cost prohibits them from obtaining counsel.248 
 
240.  In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 9.  Municipalities persist in this practice 
despite the cost of incarcerating criminal debtors in the modern debtors’ prison 
outweighing the revenue generated.  In Pennsylvania, inmates “who are eligible for 
release but are kept in prison based on their inability to pay a $60 fee” cost “nearly 
$100 per day” to confine.  Patel, supra note 105, at 6.  One county in North Carolina 
“arrested 564 people because they fell behind on debt; the County jailed 246 debtors 
who did not pay for an average of 4 days.  The county collected $33,476 while the jail 
term itself cost $40,000—a loss for the county of $6,524.”  Id. 
241.  See Washington’s DP, supra note 93, at 9. 
242.  In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 10; see supra Part I.B.3. 
243.  See supra Section II.D.4. 
244.  See supra Section II.D.3.   
245.  See supra Section I.B.2.  
246.  See Class Action Complaint at 27, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-
00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-Jennings-Debtors-Prisons-FILE-STAMPED.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YA58-QVQP]; Complaint, Foster v. City of Alexander City at 9–10, 
No. 3:15-cv-647-WKW (M.D. Ala Sept. 8, 2015), 2015 WL 5256630; Complaint, 
Thompson v. DeKalb Cty., No. 1:15-mi-99999-UNA (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2015.01.29_filed_thompson_complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F5W8-BN58]; see generally Class Action Complaint, Bell v. City of 
Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-732-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015), 2015 WL 5949208. 
247.  See supra Section I.C.4.c. 
248.  See Patel, supra note 105, at 6; supra text accompanying note 64. 
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The institution of peonage did not exist in a vacuum; it 
emerged from the Southern white conservatives’ reaction to the 
perceived threat emancipation and Reconstruction posed their 
power and affluence.249  Likewise, the modern debtors’ prison 
cannot be separated from the contemporary context in which it 
arose.250  The system of mass incarceration of primarily African 
American men, to which the modern debtors’ prison contributes,251 
has become a palatable reality for many Americans partly because 
of anti-black sentiment,252 which, if not created, was reinforced by a 
highly effective media campaign in the 1980s.253  Mass incarceration 
has normalized jailing millions of people,254 primarily low-income 
African American men,255 and supported public opinion that is 
both highly punitive and highly racialized.256  As fear and anxiety 
about drug crime grew, so too did the prison population.257  With 
this as its contemporary backdrop, the modern debtors’ prison is 
highly racialized, targets indigent defendants, and seems to exist in 
many, albeit not exclusively, Southern states where peonage 
previously thrived.258  These noticeable parallels aside, the practice 
of peonage as prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment and 
the Peonage Act does not depend on racial discrimination or 
disproportionate impacts.259  As such, the modern debtors’ prison is 
impermissible under these prohibitions. 
B. The Modern Debtors’ Prison is Not Exempt from Thirteenth 
Amendment Protection 
The Peonage Act on its own prohibits any compulsory labor 
for the purpose of repayment of debt.260  The practice of peonage, 
 
249.  See supra Section I.B.4.c. 
250.  See Hager, supra note 52.   
251.  ALEXANDER, supra note 189, at 154–57. 
252.  Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Racialized Mass Incarceration: 
Poverty, Prejudice, and Punishment, in DOING RACE: 21 ESSAYS FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 349 (Hazel R. Markus & Paula Moya, eds., New York: Norton 2010), http://
scholar.harvard.edu/files/bobo/files/2010_racialized_mass_incarceration_doing_race.pd
f [https://perma.cc/HH2U-NRMT]. 
253.  ALEXANDER, supra note 189, at 52–53. 
254.  Id. at 178–80. 
255.  FREDERICKSEN & LASSITER, supra note 78, at 7; see supra note 57. 
256.  Bobo, supra note 252, at 349. 
257.  ALEXANDER, supra note 189, at 105–06. 
258.  See DANIEL, supra note 172, at 15–16. 
259.  See supra Section II.A. 
260.  Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1903). 
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however, is often considered a subset of involuntary servitude 
under the Thirteenth Amendment, subject to its punishment 
exemption.261  Imprisonment for nonpayment of LFOs, rather than 
as punishment for the underlying offense, does not serve a punitive 
purpose and is therefore not exempt from protection under the 
Amendment.262  The Department of Justice has acknowledged, 
generally, that the concerted practices of police and courts “are 
geared not toward addressing public safety, but rather toward 
raising”263 and maximizing revenue at every stage of the criminal 
justice process, as in Ferguson.264  Since States have non-punitive 
purposes for these practices, they are constitutionally prohibited 
from imprisoning individuals for nonpayment of LFO debt. 
Several state courts have agreed with this reasoning.  In 1969, 
the Tennessee District Court voided a Tennessee statute, which 
permitted imprisonment for nonpayment of debt as a Thirteenth 
Amendment violation.265  It found that “costs are treated both 
substantively and procedurally in a manner inconsistent with the 
 
261.  Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); see supra text 
accompanying note 206.  This means that it is necessary to demonstrate how debtors’ 
prisons are not exempt from Thirteenth Amendment protections. 
262.  See Henderson, supra note 165, at 1180 (arguing the “Punishment Clause 
provides an exception only ‘as a punishment for crime,’ and not for civil, regulatory, or 
private discriminatory treatment of formerly convicted people.”).  Professor Birckhead 
in The New Peonage has also argued that practices underpinning the modern debtors’ 
prison do not fit within the exception because criminal debtors “have not, in fact, been 
‘duly convicted,’ as ‘duly’ is defined as ‘correctly, fairly, legitimately, as required, or 
rightfully.”  Birckhead, supra note 48, at 1638.  Likewise, the meaning of “duly” could 
derive from “due process,” meaning the labor could only be coerced if the defendant 
were convicted of a “crime duly proved and adjudged.”  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. 36, 50 (1872) (emphasis added).  Since Bearden and its progeny establish due 
process protections which require courts provide a hearing on the defendant’s ability to 
pay, another argument that poor criminal defendants are not “duly convicted” for their 
inability to pay is the lack of due process afforded to them by the municipal court.  See 
Section I.B.2. 
263.  Gupta & Foster, supra note 121, at 2. 
264.  FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 57, at 13. 
265.  See generally Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) 
(finding defendant’s imprisonment for failure to pay $892.38 court costs—spent 
working off costs for an additional eleven months after completing his sentence for 
three criminal convictions—involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth 
Amendment).  Shortly after this ruling, combined with a previous decision from the 
same court, Dillehay v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), prompted the state 
legislature to forbid imprisonment for nonpayment of LFO’s.  Walter Kurtz, Pay or 
Stay: Incarceration of Minor Criminal Offenders for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees, 51 
TENN. B.J. 16, 18 (2015), http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/journal_archives/2015/
TBJ0715.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8SK-LURG]. 
  
2017] INDEBTED TO THE STATE: MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS 361 
punishment theory.”266  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia reasoned that “costs assessed against a person who has 
been convicted of a crime are not part of his punishment for the 
crime,”267 and rejected its comparable state law in 1968. 
These cases additionally demonstrate the power of challenging 
the modern debtors’ prisons under the Thirteenth Amendment.268  
The Fourteenth Amendment protections under Bearden have 
failed to adequately protect against the emergence of modern 
debtors’ prison.269  Since the practice is peonage and is not imposed 
for punishment, the time has come for a new challenge to a very 
old practice—one the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits, if not by 
design, then within its foresight. 
C. Remedies Available for Violations of Rights under the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Anti-Peonage Act 
The modern debtors’ prison is peonage as prohibited by the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Peonage Act; therefore, remedies 
for violations of those rights exist.270  Prior to the passage of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 
(“TVPRA”),271 plaintiffs attempting to plead their case under the 
Thirteenth Amendment or the Anti-Peonage Act faced difficulty 
convincing courts they provided an implied right of action.272  
 
266.  Anderson, 300 F. Supp. at 792.  
267.  Wright v. Matthews, 163 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Va. 1968) (emphasis added).  For 
other states in agreement, see State ex rel. Hobbs v. Murrell, 93 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn. 
1935) (determining that after entering nolle prosequi, the defendant stood uncharged 
with any crime and therefore any imprisonment was unlawful unless he consented—
even consenting to involuntary servitude without a conviction is forbidden by 
Thirteenth Amendment.).  But see Milwaukee v. Horvath, 143 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1966) 
(holding that imprisonment for failure to pay a fine does not constitute involuntary 
servitude because imprisonment alone is not servitude; further, adopting defendant’s 
reasoning would mean that anyone who qualifies as indigent could violate city 
ordinances with impunity).  
268.  See generally Anderson, 300 F. Supp. at 789; Wright, 163 S.E.2d 158. 
269.  See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Birckhead, supra 
note 48, at 1635 (“In the years since Bearden, courts frequently have either ignored 
these constitutional protections or developed strategies to skirt their edges.”). 
270.  See Kares, supra note 136, at 380–85. 
271.  Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 18, 22 U.S.C.). 
272.  Jennifer S. Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil 
Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1663 
(2007). 
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Neither the civil273—which invalidated State laws permitting 
peonage—nor the criminal274 provision of the Peonage Act 
mentioned remedies.  Courts generally followed the guidance of 
Turner v. Unification Church275to find no implied right of action for 
violations of either the criminal prohibition against involuntary 
servitude or peonage.276  With TVPRA’s passage, Congress made a 
private right of action available for the various sections of criminal 
provisions in Chapter 77 of Title 18, such as peonage,277 sale into 
involuntary servitude,278 seizure, detention, transportation or sale 
of slaves,279 and trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, 
involuntary servitude, or forced labor.280  The private right of 
action, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1595, now allows victims to recover 
damages and attorneys’ fees against “the perpetrator (or whoever 
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value 
from participation in a venture which that person knew or should 
have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter).”281  
A plaintiff is also entitled to mandatory restitution for the full 
amount of his or her losses.282 
Congress signaled its intent to provide a remedy for victims of 
peonage and involuntary servitude with the passage of the 
TVPRA.283  This relieved a plaintiff from having to prove an 
 
273.  42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2015); see supra note 199 and accompanying text.  Prior to 
the TVPRA, the civil remedies portion only offered remedies for limited provisions 
within the civil code; the anti-peonage section was not included. 
274.  18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2015).   
275.  473 F.Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978); see Nam, supra note 272, at 1663 n.47. 
276.  Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F.Supp. 367, 374 (D.R.I. 1978) (refusing 
to apply the rationale of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to the Thirteenth Amendment and the criminal anti-
peonage provision, for which state tort law provided adequate remedies); see also 
Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: 
Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 
26–29 (2004). 
277.  18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2015). 
278.  18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2015). 
279.  18 U.S.C. § 1585 (2015).  
280.  18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2015). 
281.  18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015). 
282.  18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2015). 
283.  Judicial interpretations of federal law will assess whether Congress intended 
“to create not just a private right but a private remedy.”  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 
15 (1979)).  Where Congress includes an “express provision of one method of enforcing 
a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”  Id. at 290.  The 
TVPRA expressly provides for a civil action, for which a plaintiff can receive monetary 
 
  
2017] INDEBTED TO THE STATE: MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS 363 
implied private right of action for violations of involuntary 
servitude or peonage.284  Since the remedy is provided in the 
statutory scheme, Congress has foreclosed other remedies for such 
violations.285  This includes bringing a civil action for deprivation of 
“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.286  Therefore, the sole remedy 
available for victims of peonage and involuntary servitude exists 
within the criminal anti-involuntary servitude and peonage 
statute.287  
D. Congressional Enforcement Power of Thirteenth Amendment 
Must Be Harnessed as a Remedy Against the Modern 
Debtors’ Prison 
The 1867 Congress thought it prudent to harness its newly 
granted Thirteenth Amendment powers to curb the practice of 
peonage where it emerged, in passing the Peonage Act.288  
Likewise, this source of authority provides Congress with an 
important tool it could use to expand the remedial scheme under 
the Anti-Peonage Act and thoroughly abolish the modern debtors’ 
prison.289  To enact this systemic change, Congress should use its 
enforcement authority, under section two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, to pass remedial legislation prohibiting imprisonment 
for nonpayment of debt as a violation of the prohibition against 
peonage and involuntary servitude.290 
Congress has the means to define practices that violate the 
provisions against involuntary servitude and peonage in the 
 
damages, attorney’s fees, and restitution.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2015); Nam, supra note 
272, at 1665. 
284.  Hernandez v. Attisha, No. 09-CV-2257-IEG (WMC), 2010 WL 816160, at 
*2–3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2010); Nam, supra note 272, at 1663. 
285.  See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290. 
286.  See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 365 (1992) (“[Section] 1983 is not 
available to enforce a violation of a federal statute ‘where Congress has foreclosed such 
enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself . . . .’”) (Blackmun J., dissenting) 
(quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 
(1987)). 
287.  Typically, there can be no private causes of action inferred from a criminal 
statute, but “that is irrelevant where Congress” has expressly provided for one.  
Hernandez, 2010 WL 816160, at *3. 
288.  See Soifer, supra note 200, at 1616–17. 
289.  See In for a Penny, supra note 13, at 5. 
290.  See TSESIS 2004, supra note 23, at 92–93. 
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Thirteenth Amendment and legislate to prohibit such practices.291  
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment292 and the Commerce Clause,293 
which have each justified civil rights statutes, the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s scope has not been subject to recent restrictions.294  
Therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment holds a uniquely far-
reaching enforcement power and should be harnessed to prevent 
the modern debtors’ prisons from trapping individuals in a modern 
system of peonage.295 
1. The City of Boerne “Congruence and Proportionality” 
Rule Does Not Apply to the Thirteenth Amendment 
Thirteenth Amendment scholars debate as to what, exactly, 
the Thirteenth Amendment and Jones permit Congress to do in 
interpreting the “badges and incidents” of slavery.296  Concern is 
especially heightened since the Supreme Court’s restriction of 
Congress’s enforcement authority under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a sister Reconstruction amendment.297  In City of 
Boerne v. Flores, the Court limited the Fourteenth Amendment 
“remedial” powers of Congress only to “‘enforc[ing]’ the 
provisions” it has been given, “not the power to determine what 
constitutes a constitutional violation.”298  When Congress passes 
preventative remedial measures, “[t]here must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.”299 
The Court has avoided resolving the question of whether City 
 
291.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).   
292.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
293.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
294.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (reaffirming that 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority is “not without effective bounds”) (citing 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 519–20 (1997) (restricting Congress’s power to legislate under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce only those rights the Court determined are within its scope).  
295.  See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1905) (quoting Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)) (“Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to 
meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by [the Thirteenth 
Amendment].”). 
296.  Carter, supra note 156, at 1314.   
297.  See generally McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 77. 
298.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–19 (1997).   
299.  Id. at 520.  In other words, Congress cannot enact Fourteenth Amendment 
legislation that creates a new source of substantive rights the Court has not read the 
Amendment to provide.  See McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 80–81.   
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of Boerne applies to the Thirteenth Amendment.300  However, 
lower courts that have interpreted City of Boerne have reasoned 
that since the Court made no mention of Jones and its precedent 
for Thirteenth Amendment interpretation, City of Boerne stands.301  
Further, the City of Boerne rationale does not limit the Thirteenth 
Amendment because the Thirteenth Amendment is different from 
the other Reconstruction Amendments.  Although the three 
Reconstruction Amendments have a singular “unity of 
purpose”302—to establish and expand civil rights, especially but not 
exclusively, for African Americans—each Amendment provided 
different means to achieve this purpose.303  The Court, as early as 
1883, declared this to be true, even while it sought to limit the 
scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
powers.304 
We must not forget that the province and scope of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments are different; the 
former simply abolished slavery: the latter prohibited the States 
from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States . . . .  The amendments are different, and the 
powers of Congress under them are different.305 
These Amendments also differ in the nature of their targeted 
action.  The Fifteenth Amendment specifically provided African 
Americans the right to vote.306  Further, whereas “[t]he prohibitions 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are largely upon the 
acts of the states,” the Thirteenth Amendment “names no party or 
authority,” in either section one or section two.307  The Court went 
further to pronounce that “[t]he differences between the 
[Amendments] have been so fully considered by this [C]ourt that it 
is enough to refer to the decisions.”308 
 
300.  McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 102.   
301.  United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048–49 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(upholding defendants’ conviction under the Hate Crimes Act for harassing and 
assaulting a young disabled Navajo man). 
302.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67 (1873). 
303.  See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
304.  United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883). 
305.  Id.  Much of this reasoning has been expanded since 1883, as previously 
mentioned, however it stands as a powerful signal of the distinctions between the 
Thirteenth Amendment and its companion Reconstruction Amendments. 
306.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV.  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71. 
307.  Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 216. 
308.  Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 23, 27). 
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Even among modern scholars who fiercely debate Boerne’s 
relevancy to the Thirteenth Amendment’s section two powers, 
there remains agreement that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments differ with respect to their diverging focuses on state 
versus private action.309  However, this debate only becomes 
necessary to delve into, if the subject of Congressional action falls 
outside the categories of “slavery” or “involuntary servitude.”  
Certainly there is no disagreement that Congress may act in the 
face of the Thirteenth Amendment’s direct prohibitions.310  When 
this is the case, Congress is entitled, even compelled, to act under 
its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers: 
This amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-
executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms 
are applicable to any existing state of circumstances . . . .  Still, 
legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various 
cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe 
proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit.  And 
such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for 
the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws 
establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration 
that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part 
of the United States.311 
Unless and until Jones is overturned, the judiciary has defined, 
in section one of the Thirteenth Amendment, the boundaries of 
substantive rights that Congress is entitled to legislate against: its 
rational determinations of its “badges and incidents” of slavery.312  
 
309.  See Jennifer Mason McAward, Congressional Authority to Interpret the 
Thirteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Tsesis, 71 MD. L. REV. 60, 75 (2011) 
[hereinafter McAward 2011]; Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret 
the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 40, 55 (2011) [hereinafter Tsesis 2011]. 
310.  “Enslavement, involuntary servitude, or their modern equivalents [which] 
are not ‘badges and incidents’ of slavery: they are slavery.  The question of whether a 
person suffers slavery’s lingering effects . . . is a different question from whether that 
person is literally enslaved or compelled to labor on behalf of another.”  Carter, supra 
note 156, at 1365.  
311.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.  
312.  Mark, supra note 135, at 712–13.  Professor McAward, in her article, argued 
that the Jones precedent does leave to Congress the opportunity to alter the landscape 
of section one’s grant of substantive rights.  McAward 2010, supra note 21, at 137–38.  
Professor McAward advocates for a more (but not the most) restrictive interpretation, 
which would “revise Jones by clarifying that Congress’s discretion is limited to 
identifying which badges and incidents of slavery it will address—not defining them 
outright—and then determining how it will address them.”  Id. at 142.   
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However, since the modern debtors’ prison is peonage,313 
prohibited as a form of involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Congress is compelled to legislate against the 
practice.314 
2. Federalism Issues Do Not Stand Up Against Violations of 
the Thirteenth Amendment 
Concerns about an expansive growth of federal power will 
naturally arise following a proposal that Congress enact remedial 
legislation prohibiting the modern debtors’ prison.315  Like the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Thirteenth 
Amendment transformed the balance of power between the federal 
government and the states, preempting state laws that create 
conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude.316  Each 
Amendment limited a state’s power to inhibit the civil rights of, 
primarily African American, citizens.317  In passing the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the Supremacy Clause318 took effect to shift the 
power to acquiesce or invalidate slavery into the purview of the 
federal government.319  Congress debated the federalism issue at 
great length, but, ultimately passed the Thirteenth Amendment, 
since, “[t]he principles of federalism had to yield to the moral 
demands of abolition.”320  Therefore, in keeping with this purpose, 
state and local policies which imprison individuals for nonpayment 
of debt violate the Thirteenth Amendment and should be 
invalidated over any countervailing federalism concerns.321 
CONCLUSION 
The existence of debtors’ prisons has plagued this nation since 
its infancy.  This new form of debt slavery, in which indigent 
 
313.  See supra Section II.A. 
314.  Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1905) (quoting Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20). 
315.  See Kares, supra note 136, at 408–09. 
316.  George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1380–81 (2008). 
317.  Id. 
318.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
319.  Rutherglen, supra note 316, at 1380–81; see Kares, supra note 136, at 408–
09. 
320.  Rutherglen, supra note 316, at 1382; see Kares, supra note 136, at 382–84. 
321.  See generally Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); 
Wright v. Matthews, 163 S.E.2d 158 (Va. 1968). 
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criminal defendants become inescapably indebted to the state, 
defies the most basic values of human decency.  While the Supreme 
Court requires additional due process for indigent defendants, 
these protections have failed to stem the tide of this epidemic.  
However, it is precisely this institution the Thirteenth Amendment 
was designed to prevent: a system that exploits the labor of poor 
people, while the financially fortunate walk free.  Congress, in the 
face of such disparity, is compelled to act to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and prove once and for all that today’s debtors’ 
prisons, an impermissible form of slavery and involuntary 
servitude, have no place in a humane society. 
 
